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Arno W Krebs, Jr. *
I. LIABILITY INSURANCE
Personal Injury Protection Coverage. During the past year the Texas
Supreme Court and the courts of civil appeals had several occassions to
interpret the scope of personal injury protection (PIP) coverage provided
by automobile liability policies issued in accordance with article 5.06-3 of
the Texas Insurance Code.' In most of these cases the courts chose not to
extend previous interpretations of medical payment and uninsured motor-
ist provisions of automobile liability policies to PIP coverage.
In Sterling v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.2 the Beaumont court
of civil appeals decided two previously unresolved questions concerning
PIP coverage. The insured, Sterling, was killed instantly while operating
one of two automobiles owned by him, both of which were covered by
policies issued by the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company. The
insurer paid for funeral expenses, but refused to pay any benefits for loss
of income caused by the death of the insured. While PIP coverage in-
cludes the "payment of benefits for loss of income as a result of the acci-
dent,"3 the policy approved by the Board of Insurance provides that
benefits are to be paid for the insured's loss of income only while he is
living. The Sterling court held that the board's approval of the inclusion
of the words "while living" in the policy was consistent with the statute,
reasoning that the legislature intended to provide funeral expenses if death
resulted and benefits for loss of income if disability resulted.
The court in Sterling also answered the more important question
whether benefits provided by PIP coverage on two separate cars may be
"stacked," in which case the insured would be allowed to combine the pol-
icy limits for each of the cars in determining his maximum recovery. Al-
though medical payment coverage can be aggregated in this fashion,4 the
court refused to allow stacking of PIP coverage. From a reading of the PIP
endorsement, the two or more automobiles provision appearing elsewhere
in the policy was clearly inapplicable to PIP coverage; thus, the ambiguity
• B.A., Texas A&M University; LL.B., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Ful-
bright & Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
1. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-78).
2. 555 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont), opinion on motion for rehearing, 564
S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ).
3. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-78).
4. Harlow v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 439 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1969, writ reed n.r.e.); Southwestern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Atkins, 346 S.W.2d 892 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston 196 1, no writ).
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that allowed aggregation of medical payments was not present. The stat-
ute limited recovery to not in excess of "$2,500 for all benefits, in the ag-
gregate, for each person.",
5
This common-sense construction of the PIP statute was again applied in
Holyteld v. Members Mutual Insurance Co.6 The insured in Holyfleld paid
separate premiums on two automobiles, but his son was injured while rid-
ing a motorcycle upon which no PIP premiums had been paid. The policy
excluded recovery for injuries sustained in a vehicle owned by insured
which was not an "insured motor vehicle," and defined an "insured motor
vehicle" as one upon which a specific premium for personal injury protec-
tion was paid.' Since the motorcycle was not described or listed in the
policy and no specific premium was charged to insure its operators, the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of coverage. In so doing,
the court refused to follow Western Alliance Insurance Co. v. Dennis,' in
which the Texarkana court reasoned that an exclusion relating to PIP cov-
erage was an unlawful restriction of the coverage provided by the statute.
In Holyfleld the Dallas court stated that although the statute sets forth
what type of coverage must be provided,9 it neither dictates which vehicles
must be covered nor prevents the insurer and the insured from agreeing on
coverage of only certain vehicles."° The supreme court, in a per curiam
opinion refusing Holyfield's application for writ of error, expressly disap-
proved the Dennis decision."
In Unigard Security Insurance Co. v. Schaefer'2 the question addressed
was whether endorsement 119, which allows the insured to exclude a par-
ticular driver from the coverage provided by the main provisions of the
policy, also excluded the specified driver from PIP benefits that are pro-
vided under endorsement 243.13 The court held that endorsement 119 is
actually an exclusion and is, thus, not applicable to PIP coverage by virtue
of the "conditions" section of endorsement 243.14 Furthermore, the court
stated that even if endorsement 119 was not inapplicable because of the
terms of endorsement 243, it would still be insufficient as a partial rejection
of PIP coverage. Endorsement 119 is written in broad language, not spe-
5. 564 S.W.2d at 780.
6. 566 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), writ re'dn.r.e. per curiam, 572 S.W.2d 672
(Tex. 1978).
7. Specifically, the policy covered "la]n automobile described in the policy to which
bodily injury liability coverage applies and/or which a s ecfc premium charge indicates that
personal injury protection is afforded" 566 S.W.2d at 2 (emphasis by the court).
8. 529 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ).
9. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-78).
10. The insurer always should be entitled to set out accurately in the policy the risks
insured against and to charge a premium based on those risks. Refusing to allow the insurer
this freedom would undermine the current method of setting insurance premiums on the
basis of the risks insured against.
I1. 572 S.W.2d at 673.
12. 572 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. 1978).
13. Endorsement 243 is the PIP form promulgated by the Board of Insurance.
14. This portion of endorsement 243 provides: " 'None of the insuring agreements, ex-
clusions or conditions of the policy shall apply to the insurance afforded by this endorsement
.. '(Emphasis added.)" 572 S.W.2d at 306.
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cifically mentioning personal injury protection, and as a matter of public
policy, PIP coverage is to be provided unless specifically rejected in writ-
ing. In this case the court refused to allow the broad exclusion under en-
dorsement 119 to qualify as a specific rejection of the coverage.
The supreme court noted that in Greene v. Great American Insurance
Co. 15 a 119 endorsement was held effective as a partial rejection of unin-
sured motorist coverage. The court, however, distinguished this case be-
cause of the differences that exist between the uninsured motorist act and
the personal injury protection act. Nevertheless, because the two cover-
ages share similar public policy aspects, and require a clear and express
rejection of coverage, the court disapproved all language in Greene con-
trary to its holding in Schaefer.16
In Birdow v. Texas Farmers Insurance Co. 7 the court of civil appeals
held that personal injury protection coverage was not subject to the ten-
day grace period that is provided for accident and sickness policies. I8 The
plaintiffs had not renewed their automobile liability policy, which included
PIP coverage. Three days after the expiration of the policy, an accident
occurred. Article 3.70-8 of the Insurance Code' 9 provides that nothing in
the Act regarding accident and sickness insurance shall affect any policy of
liability insurance with or without supplementary expense coverage. The
court held that the policy issued containing the personal injury protection
endorsement was clearly a liability policy with supplementary expense
coverage, and therefore was excluded from the grace period described by
article 3.70-3(A)(3).
Uninsured Motorist Coverage. Only two cases interpreting uninsured mo-
torist protection coverage merit inclusion in the Survey. In Burson v. Em-
ployers Casualty Co.20 the court was faced with a question concerning the
sufficiency of the evidence introduced by the insured to prove the existence
of an insurance contract. Instead of offering the policy itself, the insured
introduced only the "insurance renewal certificate," which indicated the
dates of coverage, that uninsured motorist coverage was provided, and that
a premium had been charged for this coverage. The renewal certificate did
not indicate that uninsured motorist coverage had been rejected, and the
court held that this was sufficient to prove that such coverage existed. The
terms of the insurance contract were supplied by article 5.06-1 of the
Texas Insurance Code,2' of which the court took judicial notice. The court
distinguished Ranger County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Chrysler Credit
15. 516 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
16. 572 S.W.2d at 308.
17. 568 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
18. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.70-3(A)(3) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-78) provides: "A
grace period of. . . [10] days will be granted for the payment of each premium. during
which grace period the policy shall continue in force."
19. Id. art. 3.70-8.
20. 558 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ).
21. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-I (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-78).
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Corp. ,22 in which an insurance binder had been found to be insufficient
evidence of insurance coverage. Ranger was distinguishable because the
insurance binder in that case had, by its own terms, expired prior to the
date of the loss.
The form of rejection required to exclude uninsured motorist coverage
was considered by the court in Employers Casualty Co. v. Sloan.2 3 The
insured initially had individual policies on his automobiles and trucks.
Some of the policies provided for uninsured motorist coverage and some
contained written rejections of such coverage. Subsequently, all of the pol-
icies were cancelled and a fleet policy was issued covering all of the vehi-
cles. This policy contained no endorsement for uninsured motorist
coverage, and no premium was charged for the coverage. The insured did
sign an application that listed the automobiles that were covered and the
types of coverage provided, but failed to execute a written rejection of the
uninsured motorist coverage. The insured, however, had orally rejected
the coverage. At the time of the accident a second fleet policy had been
issued, which similarly did not contain an endorsement or show a charge
for uninsured motorist coverage.
The trial court found that the oral rejection was insufficient because rule
10 of the Board of Insurance requires that uninsured motorist coverage be
rejected only in writing.24 The insurer contended that an oral rejection
was sufficient because the statute does not require a written rejection25 and
the Board of Insurance had no authority to promulgate a rule making such
a requirement. The court of civil appeals held that since the Board of
Insurance has the authority to promulgate rules so long as such rules are
not inconsistent with the statutes,26 it can require a written rejection of
coverage even though the statutory provision does not so require. The
court added that to hold that this coverage could be excluded by oral rejec-
tion would do violence to the spirit of the statute and would invite abuses
and litigation such as the case before the court. Therefore, the court also
rejected the insurer's contention that the insured waived the written rejec-
tion requirement of rule 10. The broad language in this opinion indicates
that it will be impossible for an insured to waive the requirement of a
written rejection of uninsured motorist coverage.
Conditions. During the survey period the Texas courts were again faced
with several cases involving the rights of the insured and the duties of the
22. 501 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1973).
23. 565 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
24. Id. at 582.
25. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-78) provides in this
regard:
(1) The coverages required under this Article shall not be applicable where
any insured named in the policy shall reject the coverage; provided that unless
the named insured thereafter requests such coverage in writing, such coverage
need not be provided in or supplemental to a renewal policy where the named
insured has rejected the coverage in connection with a policy previously issued
to him by the same insurer.
26. Id art. 5.10 (Vernon 1963).
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insurer under a liability policy. In Weaver v. Hartford Accident & Indem-
nity Co. ,27 a Texas Supreme Court decision, a judgment creditor brought
suit against an automobile liability insurer to recover on a judgment previ-
ously obtained against an alleged omnibus insured. It was stipulated that
the alleged omnibus insured had failed to comply with the provisions of
the policy requiring him to forward suit papers. At issue was whether
compliance with this policy provision by the named insured eliminated the
necessity of compliance by the omnibus insured.
Busch, an employee of the named insured, was involved in an accident
while driving a vehicle owned by his employer. The employer's policy was
a standard automobile liability policy covering the named insured and any
other person using its automobiles with its permission. In March 1971
Weaver, the injured party, filed suit against Busch seeking damages of
$11,000. Busch was served with process in the office of the plaintiffs attor-
ney, but left the papers there. The suit papers were never forwarded to the
insurer and no answer was ever filed. Busch testified that he gave a state-
ment to the insurer during its investigation of the accident stating unequiv-
ocally that he was not operating the vehicle with the permission of his
employer at the time of the accident.
In September 1971 Weaver filed his first amended petition in which he
added the employer as a defendant, alleging that Busch was operating the
vehicle in the course and scope of his employment, and increased the ad
damnum to over $200,000. Service was had upon the employer, who
promptly forwarded the citation and petition to the insurer, and an answer
was filed on the insured's behalf. Busch, however, was never served with
the amended petition. Subsequently, the injured plaintiff nonsuited the
employer and obtained a default judgment against Busch for an amount in
excess of the $100,000 policy limit.
This suit ensued against the insurer on the basis of the default judgment
against Busch. At trial the jury found that Busch was operating the vehicle
with the permission of the employer, thereby making him an insured.
Judgment was rendered for Weaver in the sum of $100,000. The court of
civil appeals reversed and rendered,28 and the supreme court affirmed,
holding that since Busch had failed to comply with policy conditions, had
stated he was not a permissive user, and had never been served with the
amended petition, Hartford was under no duty to defend him volunta-
rily.29 The supreme court distinguished Employers Casualty Co. v. Glens
Falls Insurance Co. ,30 wherein the court held that timely notice of the acci-
dent by the named insured fully satisfied the policy provision requiring
notice, making it unnecessary for the omnibus insured to give additional
notice. Since the rationale for the notice requirement is to enable the in-
surer to investigate the circumstances of the accident promptly, while the
27. 570 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1978).
28. 556 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977).
29. 570 S.W.2d at 370.
30. 484 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1972).
1979]
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evidence is still fresh, no purpose would be served by requiring the omni-
bus insured to give additional notice of the same accident. The court
stated that a different purpose underlies the requirement that the insured
immediately forward suit papers: papers are forwarded to advise the in-
surer that the insured has been served with process and that the insurer is
expected to file a timely answer.3' The need for the additional notice of
service was evident in the instant case, as Busch was never served with the
amended petition that raised the damage plea by almost $200,000.32
A vigorous dissenting opinion was written by Justice McGee, with a
concurring dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Greenhill. Justice McGee
stated that the main purpose of the provision requiring forwarding of suit
papers is to make certain that the insurer has the right to control the litiga-
tion and defend the suit on the merits, a purpose that is fulfilled when the
named insured forwards the papers. It is not clear whether Justice McGee
would require the insurer to defend an "omnibus insured" who had not
been served merely because the named insured had been served and had
forwarded the suit papers to the insurer. Under such circumstances, how-
ever, he clearly would require the insurer to defend an omnibus insured
who had been served but who had failed to forward the suit papers.
The approach advocated by the dissent would force the insurance com-
pany to defend someone who, for reasons known only to the defendant,
has failed to forward suit papers. Such a person may have no intention of
becoming involved in the lawsuit or of cooperating with either the insur-
ance company or its lawyers. As was stated by the majority, requiring the
insurer to defend an alleged omnibus insured who had failed to forward
suit papers would place upon the insurer the duty of determining whether
such an insured has been served.33 Further, it might well require the in-
surer to defend an uncooperative and hostile client.
The decision in Insurance Company of North America v. ASARCO,
Inc.3 4 illustrates the difficulty that court and juries have construing the
notice provisions in liability policies. An alleged incident occurred on or
about October 17, 1973, when William Priebe, an employee of an in-
dependent contractor working on the ASARCO premises, allegedly was
injured as a result of exposure to chemical fumes. ASARCO's policy pro-
vided that "[i]n the event of an occurrence, written notice ...shall be
given by or for the Insured to the Company. . .as soon as practicable."35
Priebe filed suit in October 1974, and ASARCO immediately notified
INA, its insurer. This was the first notice INA had received of the occur-
rence. On November 12, INA advised defense counsel that Lindsey &
31. An additional purpose is to enable the insurer to control the litigation and interpose
a defense. 570 S.W.2d at 369.
32. Id. at 370. New citation is necessary for a party who has not appeared when the
plaintiff, by amended petition, seeks a more onerous judgment than that originally prayed
for. Eg., Sanchez v. Texas Indus., Inc., 485 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
33. 570 S.W.2d at 369.
34. 562 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
35. Id. at 558.
[Vol. 33
INSURANCE LAW
Newsom would investigate both the accident and possible coverage
problems caused by the insured's late notice.
On November 18, the investigator from Lindsey & Newsom visited
ASARCO's plant, contacted Hudson, the plant personnel and safety direc-
tor, and asked to see the information that ASARCO had in Priebe's file.
The investigator did not advise Hudson that he was investigating both the
accident and the late notice question. Hudson gave the investigator the
Priebe file, which included a November 5, 1973, letter from the plant phy-
sician to Hudson regarding "a medical-legal problem" arising from the
injury allegedly suffered by Priebe.36 After receiving the letter, Hudson
had notified the plant manager of its contents and had placed the letter in
a folder labeled "William Priebe." This folder had been deposited in the
general information file. Upon reading this letter, the investigator did not
ask Hudson why a copy of the letter had not been sent to INA. He then
toured the ASARCO premises, took several pictures, and left. Approxi-
mately two months later the investigator sent a reservation of rights letter
to ASARCO, and two weeks after that INA informed ASARCO that it
would no longer defend the Priebe suit.
Hudson first became aware that Priebe was actually making a claim
against ASARCO on November 18, 1974, when the investigator so in-
formed him. Hudson assumed that the investigator was representing
ASARCO's interests and testified that had he known that the investigator
was representing another party, INA, he would have given different an-
swers to the questions asked him.37 He further indicated he would not
have made his file fully available to the investigator.
It was undisputed that at the time in question Priebe was working at the
ASARCO plant. Although several ASARCO employees were working in
the same area, none of them reported any incident or unusual occurrence
such as Priebe had described to the doctor. An ASARCO employee who
supervised the area testified that he would have been in a position to know
whether an accident had occurred and that it would not have occurred in
the routine, ordinary course of business of the operations at the plant.
The jury found that: (1) ASARCO had given notice as soon as practica-
ble; (2) although INA did not waive the notice provision, it did lead
ASARCO to believe that it would not insist upon compliance; and (3)
ASARCO relied upon INA's conduct to the extent that it believed that
INA would defend the suit without insisting upon compliance with the
notice provision.38 The court of civil appeals affirmed, using a questiona-
ble line of analysis. The court stated that it was uncontroverted that Priebe
36. Id. at 559 n. I. This letter related to a telephone call from Dr. Brown regarding
apparent injuries to Priebe caused by his inhaling green gas on the ASARCO premises. Dr.
Brown questioned the man's injuries, and according to the letter, thought that he was proba-
bly a hysterical, malingering type of individual.
37. Id at 561. There is no indication whether Hudson was asked what answers he
would have changed and how he would have changed them, nor whether he could have
done so and still truthfully answered the investigator's question.
38. Id. at 559.
1979]
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was an employee of a third party and not under the control of ASARCO.
Further, it was conclusively established that no such occurrence had been
reported by Priebe or any ASARCO employees to any ASARCO person-
nel. The "only inkling of such an occurrence 39 stemmed from Dr.
Brown's having told the company doctor what Priebe had told him. The
letter from the company doctor to the personnel and safety director was
determined to be insufficient to put the insured on notice of an event that
should have been reported to the insurer.
The court in ASARCO recognized neither the realities of the case nor
the realities of our litigious society. There is no evidence that ASARCO
made any type of investigation to determine whether an occurrence had
taken place that could have resulted in Priebe's alleged injuries.4 °
ASARCO failed to act, even though the company doctor had stated that
the problem "might represent a medical-legal problem."'" Liability insur-
ance is purchased to protect the purchaser from losses caused by his negli-
gent conduct. It is not the insured's decision whether suit will be brought
against it; therefore, the insured should not be allowed to make a determi-
nation as to what claims or possible claims should or should not be re-
ported to the insurer. Undoubtedly it was questionable whether the
incident alleged in ASARCO had occurred. Nevertheless, as those in the
legal community recognize, an incident such as the one reported by Priebe
frequently results in suits and even judgments.42 Once an insured is aware
of an incident, or an alleged incident, it should become incumbent upon
the insured to give notice to the insurer. It should not be left to the discre-
tion of the insured to determine whether the claim is frivolous, whether
there is no liability, or whether the incident did not occur.4 3 This should
be left to the insurer in its investigative and handling capacity, and if suit is
filed and litigated, to the trier of fact.
In Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Newell Manufacturing Co. the in-
surer defended the insured in spite of the insured's failure to give notice of
the accident, raising a question as to who would pay the settlement subse-
quently agreed to by the insured. The insurer had notified the insured by
letter that it had accepted the citation and petition in the suit "under a
strict reservation of rights,"45 as the insured had failed to give notice of the
39. Id at 561.
40. In Dunn v. Travelers Indem. Co., 123 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1941) (interpreting Texas
law), the court held an investigation of the alleged incident included not only interviewing
all eyewitnesses, but also determining from the claimant himself what he was claiming and
what he intended to do.
41. 562 S.W.2d at 559 n.I.
42. 2 R. LONG, LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 13.11, at 13-25 (1978); see, e.g., Gonza-
les v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 571 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978). It is extremely doubtful that
Caterpillar Tractor Company personnel would have believed that a claim would have arisen
when someone slipped off the steps of one of their caterpillars after entering and exiting the
unit numerous times. Yet this occurred and resulted in a judgment in excess of $250,000.
43. 2 R. LONG, supra note 42, § 13.12, at 13-27.
44. 566 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
45. This letter in part provided:
If at any time we determine that there has been a contractual violation of the
[Vol. 33
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accident. The matter was set for trial, and counsel retained by the insurer
appeared on behalf of the insured. After the jury was selected, the counsel
for plaintiff offered to settle the matter. At that time the insurer and in-
sured entered into a written agreement whereby the suit would be settled
without the insurer's waiving any of its rights under the prior reservation
of rights letter. It was also agreed that the insurer's payment of the settle-
ment would not be deemed a waiver, estoppel, or forfeiture of any other
rights of the insurer secured by the reservation of rights letter. In the sub-
sequent action to determine which company was responsible for the pay-
ment of the settlement, the trial court granted a summary judgment on
behalf of the insured, and the court of civil appeals affirmed.
In determining the validity of the reservation of rights the court was
faced with a question of first impression in Texas.4 6 Although the insured
did not sign the reservation of rights letter, the insurer's offer to defend
under the reservation of rights was not rejected. The consent of the in-
sured was inferred from his conduct after receiving notice of the insurer's
offer. If, with knowledge of the offer, the insured stands by, expresses no
objections, and allows the insurer to defend the action, under the ordinary
rules of contract law the consent of the insured is implied. If, on the other
hand, the insured refuses to accept the offer of defense under such condi-
tions and so notifies the insurer, the insurer must make a decision either to
defend the action or to withdraw.
Even though the court held that the insured's conduct amounted to an
acceptance of the terms of the reservation of rights letter, the ambiguities
within that letter caused the court to affirm the judgment in favor of the
insured. The court stated that the only right clearly retained by the insurer
was the right to withdraw from the defense of the suit upon proper notice;
the insurer had no right to disclaim liability once the liability of the in-
sured had been established. Because of the ambiguities within the reserva-
tion of rights letter, this case should not be considered as authority
concerning the rights of the insured or the insurer when there has been a
properly drawn reservation of rights letter. When a case is settled out of
court the insurer and the insured should be able to reserve their rights to
determine who is responsible for the payment of the settlement.4 7
policy conditions, we reserve the right to withdraw upon proper notice to you.
Further, we will instigate our initial investigation at once but our investigation
is conducted under this reservation afore mentioned [sic] and any actions that
we may take, either by way of investigation or by way of defense of the pend-
ing litigation, shall not be deemed an estoppel of the rights afore mentioned
[sic]. Further, we must advise that we are requesting your complete coopera-
tion during the investigation that we will hereinafter conduct .... Pending
further notification from us in writing we will do any and all things to investi-
gate and to protect your interests in accordance with the contractual obligation
of the insurance policy.
Id at 75.
46. The traditional agreement used is a nonwaiver agreement that is executed by both
the insurer and the insured.
47. The initial election to defend does not obligate the insurer to furnish a complete and
continuing defense. Consolidated Underwriters v. Loyd W. Richardson Constr. Corp., 444
1979]
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Coverage. In Ridgway v. Gulf L!fe Insurance Co.4 8 judgment creditors
brought a garnishment proceeding against the judgment debtor's primary
liability carrier, Gulf Insurance Company. The prior judgment had been
rendered in a suit involving Holcombe, as driver of a truck, and Barry
Trucking Company, Holcombe's employer.49 Gulf impleaded Ranger In-
surance Company, the umbrella liability carrier for the judgment debtor,
demanding that Ranger pay the remaining unpaid portions of the judg-
ment. Gulf argued that its policy covered only Barry, and Ranger, as the
umbrella carrier, covered Holcombe; thus, Gulf contended, Ranger should
bear ultimate financial responsibility."
In rejecting this argument, the court held that even assuming arguendo
that Gulf's policy did not cover Holcombe, Gulf's theory completely ig-
nored the scope of Ranger's umbrella liability policy. Ranger's umbrella
policy provided that the insured was obligated to obtain comprehensive
automobile liability insurance for bodily injury to the limits of $100,000 as
underlying coverage. If the insured failed to carry such insurance, Ranger
would be liable only as if the insured had carried it, that is, Ranger would
only be liable to the extent that damages exceeded $100,000.11
The court, however, found that Holcombe was in fact an "insured"
under Gulf s policy. Even though the policy excluded the owner of a hired
automobile from coverage,5" the main provision of the policy did insure
''any person while using an owned automobile or a hired automobile with
the permission of the named insured";53 here Barry was the named in-
sured. The court rejected Gulfs contention that the endorsement exclud-
ing the owner of a hired automobile excluded Holcombe from coverage.
The exclusion was interpreted as eliminating coverage of the owner of a
leased vehicle for some condition of the vehicle that might give rise to
liability to a third party; it did not apply when the owner negligently oper-
ated the vehicle. The court stated that "when the terms of an insurance
S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969, writ refd n.r.e.). Nevertheless, where the
proceedings have gone so far that the interests of the insurer and the insured conflict, and
the insured would be prejudiced by the insurer's withdrawal, it has been held that the latter
cannot withdraw, even though its rights have been properly preserved. 7A J. APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4694, at 549 (1962).
48. 578 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1978).
49. As the court sets out, the truck that was involved in the accident was owned by
Holcombe and leased to Barry Trucking Company for use in its trucking business. Barry
then hired Holcombe to drive the truck. This is apparently a common arrangement in the
trucking business. Id at 1028 n.l.
50. Id at 1030.
51. Id The court also rejected Gulf's argument that as Holcombe did not procure the
underlying insurance, Holcombe was protected by another clause in the Ranger policy that
provided a retained limit of $25,000 for losses not covered by underlying insurance; L*e., for
certain losses not covered by underlying insurance, the insurer would pay all expenses in-
curred over $25,000. "This construction would reduce Ranger's policy to gibberish." Id
The court stated that the $25,000 retained limit clause was included to provide coverage to
the insured for less common losses not typically covered by liability insurance. These would
include, for example, professional liability, advertiser's liability, blanket contractual liabil-
ity, world-wide operations liability, and personal injury liability. Id




contract are capable of two or more constructions and under one a recov-
ery is allowable and under the other it is denied, the construction which
permits recovery will be given the policy."54 Thus, summary judgment
was denied Gulf and granted in part for Ranger.
11. PROPERTY INSURANCE
In Delta Lloyds Insurance Co. v. Southwest Savings Association" the
rights of a mortgagee, Southwest Savings, who had become the owner of
property after it was insured, were in question. Delta issued a fire policy
with a vandalism endorsement to the original owner. After the issuance of
the policy, the mortgagee purchased the property at a foreclosure sale for
the amount of the unpaid mortgage. Thereafter a vandalism loss occurred
and the insurer denied liability. The jury found the cost of repair to be
$60,000, but found that the mortgagee's failure to protect the property after
purchase had caused the loss. On appeal Delta asserted that Southwest
could not recover as mortgagee because its purchase of the property had
extinguished its mortgage interest prior to the loss and had changed its
status to that of an owner. Recovery as an owner was also precluded, how-
ever, because Southwest had failed to protect the property as required by
the policy. Southwest, on the other hand, contended that its foreclosure
should not affect its right to recovery as mortgagee, and that, as the mort-
gagee, it had no duty to protect the property against loss.5 6
The court held that Southwest's interest at the time of the loss was that
of an owner of the property. The court also disagreed with Southwest's
contention that since the policy only required the named insured to protect
the property, Southwest, as the mortgagee and new owner, had no such
54. Id. (quoting Kelley v. American Ins. Co., 160 Tex. 71, 325 S.W.2d 370 (1959)).
The court, following Texas precedent, held that it does not offend public policy for the
insurer to be obligated for punitive damages. Id. at 1029; see Home Indem. Co. v. Tyler,
522 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ refd n.r.e.) (exemplary
damages recoverable under uninsured motorist policy); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ refd n.r.e.) (exemplary
damages recoverable under automobile liability policy). The court did note, however, that
although the majority of states permit the insured to recover punitive damages under an
automobile liability policy, some states hold that such a recovery violates public policy.
E.g., American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966) (interpreting Kansas law);
Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962) (interpreting Florida
law).
55. 559 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
56. The relevant portions of the standard union mortgage clause provided:
This policy, as to the interest of the mortgagee only therein, shall not be
invalidated by any act or neglect of the mortgagor or owner of the within
described property, nor by any foreclosure or other proceedings or notice of
sale relating to the property, nor by any change in the title or ownership of the
property, . . . PROVIDED that the mortgagee shall notify this Company of
any change of ownership or increase of hazard which shall come to the knowl-
edge of said mortgagee ...
Failure upon the part of the mortgagee to comply with any of the foregoing
obligations shall render the insurance under this policy null and void as to the




duty. The court held that by becoming the owner of the property, the
mortgagee assumes the owner's obligations under the policy, including the
obligation to protect the property.
The effect that "other insurance" clauses contained in two fire insurance
policies had on a mortgagee was before the court in United States Fire
Insurance Co. v. Stricklin 7 Property covered by two separate policies
with similar terms was damaged, and Stricklin, a third-lien mortgagee,
sued each carrier, United States Fire and Houston General, in separate
actions. Each of the policies contained an "other insurance" clause that
was essentially a pro rata clause.58 The trial court failed to give effect to
the other insurance clause in the United States Fire policy. The court of
civil appeals, however, reversed and remanded, holding that the Houston
General policy was "other insurance" with respect to the fire. Stricklin
argued that the Houston General policy was not other insurance with re-
spect to him because he was named in the United States Fire policy as a
mortgagee-payee, but was not so named in the second policy; as to Hous-
ton General, Stricklin based his claim to recovery merely on his equitable
rights to the proceeds as the mortgagee. Thus, Stricklin contended that he
should be able to sue United States Fire for the entire amount, and assign
his rights on the Houston General policy to United States Fire. The court,
however, agreed with United States Fire's position that Stricklin's interests
under both policies were the same because of an assignment of the second-
lien mortgagee's rights, thus making nonexistent the distinction urged by
Stricklin. In so doing, the court recognized the validity of pro rata
clauses.59
The court further held that the insured's rights were not governed by St.
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Crutchfield," wherein the court held
that a mortgagee of property covered by two policies was not bound by an
apportionment clause in one of the policies and could recover its entire
loss from either insurer, subject to the policy limits. The Crutchfield court
recognized, however, that the second policy could constitute other insur-
ance, thereby requiring apportionment, if the mortgagee ratified the sec-
ond policy. The Stricklin court held that by asserting a claim against the
second insurer, Stricklin had ratified the second policy as a matter of law.
The court further held that the other insurance clause of the second pol-
icy did not violate Texas Insurance Code article 6.15 .6  The court stated
57. 556 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam, 565
S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1978).
58. The clause provided that if at the time of the loss other insurance was available to
cover the loss upon the same terms as contained in the instant policy, the company's liability
would be limited to the proportion of the loss that the limit of liability under the instant
policy bore to the total amount of insurance covering the property. 556 S.W.2d at 578.
59. Their validity in liability insurance policies had previously been recognized in Trad-
ers & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Hicks Rubber Co., 140 Tex. 586, 169 S.W.2d 142 (1943), and Employ-
ers Cas. Co. v, Transport Ins. Co., 444 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. 1969).
60. 162 Tex. 586, 350 S.W.2d 534 (1961).
61. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 6.15 (Vernon 1963). The relevant portions of this statute
provide:
The interest of a mortgagee . . . under any fire insurance contract . . . shall
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that even though the act of the owner in obtaining the second policy could
not make Stricklin subject to an apportionment or other insurance clause,
Stricklin's own act of bringing suit against the second company served as a
ratification of that policy and validated the clause. The supreme court in a
per curiam opinion ruled on damage and evidence points, but specifically
reserved the question of the effect of the mortgagee protection provided by
article 6.15.62
Misrepresentation. In Ranger Insurance Co. v. Bowie63 a pilot fraudu-
lently obtained a medical certificate from the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA) and used the certificate to procure a property insurance
policy on his plane. Suit was brought by the insured pilot's widow to re-
cover for damage to the aircraft caused by a crash in which the insured
pilot was killed. The policy provided for coverage only when the aircraft
was being piloted by one having valid pilot and medical certificates. 64 The
policy also contained a fraud or misrepresentation provision that provided
that the policy was void if the insured concealed or misrepresented any
material facts or circumstances concerning the insurance or the subject
thereof, or if the insured engaged in any fraud, attempted fraud, or false
swearing "touching any matter related to this insurance or the subject
thereof.
65
It was undisputed that the pilot filed a false written application to obtain
his medical certificate. In the application he stated that he had never had
heart trouble when in fact he had already suffered a heart attack and was
taking medication for his heart condition. It was further stipulated that
these representations were material to and actually contributed to the acci-
dent involved. Furthermore, testimony established that if the FAA had
known of the insured's true condition, it would not have issued the certifi-
cate and the company would not have issued the policy.
The plaintiff contended that since the insured's certificates had not been
amended or cancelled by the FAA, the plane was being operated by a pilot
holding a valid and effective medical certificate for purposes of the insur-
ance policy provision. The company contended that when the insured rep-
resented to it that only pilots holding valid and effective medical
certificates would operate the aircraft, he necessarily represented that he
would properly comply with all the requirements for the certificate. Fur-
ther, the company argued that the policy was void under the fraud provi-
not be invalidated by any act or neglect of the mortgagor or owner of said
described property or the happening of any condition beyond his control, and
any stipulation and any contract in conflict herewith shall be null and void.
62. 565 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1978).
63. 574 S.W.2d 540 (Tex.), rev'g 563 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978).
64. The insurance policy contained the following clause: "7. PILOT
CLAUSE: Only the following pilot or pilots holding valid and effective pilot and medical
ceritcates with rating as required by the Federal Aviation Administration for flight in-
volved will operate the aircraft in flight." 574 S.W.2d at 541 (emphasis added by the court).
65. 563 S.W.2d at 395.
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sion because the medical certificate had been fraudulently obtained, which
constituted fraud "touching" a matter material to the policy.
The court of civil appeals reversed the trial court judgment for the com-
pany and rendered judgment for the plaintiff, stating that the broad lan-
guage used in the fraud provision of the insured's policy was limited by
article 21.16 of the Insurance Code.66 The court held that this article re-
ferred only to statements made in the application or in the contract of in-
surance; it did not cover statements made to obtain a medical certificate.
The court added that there was no express language in the policy exclud-
ing coverage in the event the person piloting the aircraft made a false state-
ment to the FAA to procure a medical certificate. Further, the court noted
that to be material to the risk, a misrepresentation must induce the insur-
ance company to assume the risk,67 a circumstance not present in this case.
The stipulation that the false representation was material to the issuance of
the medical certificate was not evidence that it was material to the issuance
of the policy.
The supreme court reversed the judgment of the court of civil appeals
and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The court did not consider
the misrepresentation issue discussed by the court of civil appeals, but in-
stead addressed the question whether the pilot insured satisfied the policy
provision requiring a "valid" FAA medical certificate. The court empha-
sized that the term "valid" has been held to mean legally sufficient and
incapable of being rightfully overthrown or set aside.68 In the instant case
the medical certificate was capable of being set aside because it was ob-
tained only through the misrepresentations of the insured. The mere fact
that the certificate had not been cancelled by the FAA did not make it
valid, and therefore, under the terms of the policy, the flight upon which
this plane was damaged was excluded from coverage.
III. LIFE, HEALTH, AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE
Misrepresentations. In Robinson v. Reliable Life Insurance Co. 6 9 the
supreme court considered
66. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.16 (Vernon 1963) (emphasis added) provides:
Any provision in any contract or policy of insurance issued or contracted for
in this State which provides that the answers or statements made in the appli-
cation for such contract or in the contract of insurance, if untrue or false, shall
render the contract or policy void or voidable, shall be of no effect, and shall
not constitute any defense to any suit brought upon such contract, unless it be
shown upon the trial thereof that the matter or thing misrepresented was ma-
terial to the risk or actually contributed to the contingency or event on which
said policy became due and payable, and whether it was material and so con-
tributed to the contingency or event on which said policy became due and
payable, and whether it was material and so contributed in any case shall be a
question of fact to be determined by the court or jury trying such case.
67. Eg., Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. English, 543 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1976, no writ); Harrington v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 489 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1972, writ refd n.r.e.).
68. Edwards v. O'Neal, 28 S.W.2d 569, 572 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1930, writ
dism'd).
69. 569 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. 1978).
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whether an insurer, in order to avoid liability on a policy of life insur-
ance on the ground of false representations in the application for in-
surance, must establish both that the misrepresentation was material
to the risk undertaken by the insurer and that the condition about
which the misrepresentation was made contributed to the death of the
insured.7°
The court of civil appeals held that under article 21.16"' proof of a misrep-
resentation material to the risk without proof that the condition misrepre-
sented contributed to the loss was sufficient to avoid liability.72 The
supreme court affirmed.
The misrepresentations were that the insured had not been treated by a
doctor within the last five years, had not had any injury, illness, or opera-
tion in the past five years, and had never been hospitalized. In fact, he had
been afflicted with sickle cell anemia for several years, was under the treat-
ment of a doctor, and had been hospitalized less than two years before the
application was submitted. The only evidence as to the cause of death was
the death certificate, which stated that there were no signs of violence and
that death apparently resulted from natural causes. It was uncontroverted
that a prudent insurer would not issue a policy of life insurance on some-
one afflicted with sickle cell anemia.
Article 21.16 states that a misrepresentation material to the risk "or"
actually contributing to the event that made the policy due and payable
renders the policy voidable. The court stated there were several Texas
cases that apparently held that the representation is not material if it does
not contribute to the loss.7 3 On the other hand, there were other cases that
recognized that there is a difference between whether a condition is rele-
vant to the risk assumed by the insurance company and whether it actually
causes the loss sustained by the insured.74 The plaintiff beneficiary con-
tended that the court should substitute "and" for "or" in the statute, but
the court refused to do so, holding that "under Article 21.16 the materiality
to the risk must be viewed as of the time of the issuance of the policy
rather than at the time the loss occurred."75 The controlling question,
therefore, was whether the insurer would have assumed the risk if the truth
had been known. The uncontroverted facts showed the answer to be in the
70. Id. at 28 (emphasis by the court).
71. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.16 (Vernon 1963). The text of this article is set forth in
note 66 supra.
72. Robinson v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 554 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977).
73. Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Grafton, 414 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1967, writ refd n.r.e.); Trinity Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Hicks, 297 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1956, no writ); National Life & Accident Co. v. Dickinson, 115 S.W.2d 1180
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1938, writ dism'd). These cases confuse the requirements by as-
suming that a representation is not material to the risk if the statement does not contribute to
the loss.
74. Fidelity Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Pruitt, 23 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930,
holding approved); Jackson v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 161 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dalas 1942, writ ref d w.o.m.).
75. 569 S.W.2d at 30. The court followed Bettes v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 480 F.2d 92 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1007 (1973), which expressly held that "or" in art. 21.16 is dis-
junctive and not conjunctive.
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negative. The court also overruled the plaintiffs contention that the policy
should not be cancelled because the insured, a sixteen-year-old boy, did
not sign the application. The evidence established that the father, who was
the beneficiary, dealt with the agent, paid the premiums, and accepted de-
livery of the policy with the application attached. Under such circum-
stances, the father must be held to have ratified any false statements in the
application.
Insurability. In Scarborough v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.7 6 the supreme
court interpreted a "continuing treatment" exclusion contained in a group
life insurance policy. The exclusion encompassed any expenses incurred
by the insured or his family during the first twelve months the insurance
was in force for any condition that had necessitated treatment during the
three-month period immediately preceding the effective date of the policy.
This exclusion defined treatment of a condition as "receiving either medi-
cal services or prescribed drugs or medicines.""
The policy became effective on June 16. The insured's wife, Mrs. Scar-
borough, had gone to a gynecologist on June 6 for an annual physical ex-
amination, which revealed abdominal adhesions, abnormal ovarian
function, and enlarged ovaries. Nothing on that examination revealed that
surgery was necessary, but the doctor requested that Mrs. Scarborough re-
turn on June 17 for further examination. Although this second examina-
tion showed that she had improved, the doctor's written report concluded
with a recommendation of an ovarian excision. Mrs. Scarborough subse-
quently developed abdominal pains, and on June 30 she went to the hospi-
tal at the direction of her physician. A third examination verified the
previous condition, and surgery was performed the next day.
The jury found that during the three-month period preceding June 16
Mrs. Scarborough did not receive treatment relating to the surgery subse-
quently performed. The trial court, therefore, awarded the insured's wife
recovery of the surgical expenses. On appeal the company contended that
since the June 6 examination revealed the condition that necessitated the
surgery, that examination was a medical service constituting treatment of a
condition under the continuing treatment exclusion. The court of civil ap-
peals reversed and rendered judgment for the company,78 relying on Pro vi-
dent L!fe & Accident Insurance Co. v. Hutson,79 which defined medical
treatment to include not only an operation or prescription of drugs to re-
lieve or cure a patient's condition, but also a preliminary examination
given for the purpose of diagnosing an ailment or infirmity.
80
The supreme court reversed the court of civil appeals, holding that the
76. 572 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. 1978).
77. Id at 283.
78. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Scarborough, 556 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1977).
79. 305 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.).




exclusion was only applicable if the insured had received treatment for a
known condition within the three months preceding the effective date of
the policy; a routine physical examination that uncovered a condition sub-
sequently resulting in surgery would not trigger the application of the ex-
clusion. The court distinguished Hutson because in that case the medical
examination was given for the purpose of diagnosing an ailment, whereas
in the instant case the ailment was found during a routine physical exami-
nation.
United Savings Life Insurance Co. v. Coulson8' concerned an insurance
policy's "good health" clause, which prevented the policy from becoming
effective if at the time the policy was delivered the insured was afflicted
with a disease that increased the risk under the policy. The insured, a life
insurance agent, applied for a policy with his own company. The com-
pany rejected him as a standard risk and offered a rated up policy. At that
time he did not accept the policy. Subsequently, the insured again applied
for a policy with his company, knowing that he would not be accepted as a
standard risk due to his high blood pressure. The company again mailed
him a rated up policy. Shortly thereafter, he was diagnosed as having
heart trouble, and his doctor prescribed nitroglycerin. The insured mailed
the premium check, which was dated July 6, on July 5,82 at which time the
company was unaware of his change of condition. He died on July 6.
The jury found that although there was not a sufficient change in the
insured's condition from the date the application was submitted to the date
the rated up policy was mailed to affect his insurability, there was such a
change from the date the application was submitted to the date he finally
mailed the premium. The jury further found that the insured was aware of
the change in his condition, knew that it affected his insurability, and real-
ized that it would have medical significance to the underwriting depart-
ment of his company. Based upon these jury findings, the court of civil
appeals reversed the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff and rendered
judgment for the insurance company.
In Dickson v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Co. 83 the court construed
the credit life insurance coverage carried by a teachers' credit union. Mrs.
Dickson was diagnosed in October of 1972 as having cancer of the colon,
and from that time until her death on February 7, 1973, she was on tempo-
rary leave of absence from her teaching duties. On January 30, 1973, Mr.
and Mrs. Dickson obtained a loan from her credit union in order to
purchase a vehicle. Under an agreement with the insurance company,
when a member borrowed from the credit union he was automatically cov-
ered by insurance for the unpaid balance, provided that he was under the
age of seventy and was physically able to perform, or within a reasonable
time might be expected to resume, the usual duties of his livelihood. On
81. 560 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App. -Amarillo 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
82. Under the policy provisions the mailing of the premium by the insured was an ac-
ceptance of the policy, and the policy became effective upon that date. Id at 213.
83. 562 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
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February 1, the insured's physician examined her and found a large recur-
rence of cancer. Her pain was so severe that morphine was required, and
seven days later she died.
Incredibly, the jury found that the deceased was physically able to per-
form, or within a reasonable time might have been expected to resume, the
usual duties of her livelihood as a school teacher. The trial court entered
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the court of civil appeals af-
firmed. The court reviewed the evidence, which included lay testimony
that in January the deceased was looking fine and was excited about com-
ing back to work. Friends stated that they did not observe anything that
would lead them to believe she would be unable to return to work. The
insured's husband testified that in his opinion his wife had been making
continual improvement, and based upon his observations, he believed that
she would return to work.
The court stated that there were no Texas cases involving a similar eligi-
bility clause regarding ability to work, but held that principles of law gov-
erning the interpretation of good health clauses were equally applicable in
this case. The court stated that although lay testimony may create an issue
of fact as to good health, despite uncontroverted medical testimony to the
contrary, in the instant case the lay testimony was based solely on observa-
tions of physical appearance and light activity. Such evidence was not of
sufficient probative value to support the jury's finding. The medical testi-
mony, which showed that the deceased was in a serious state of health and
that death was imminent, should have determined the outcome of the case.
Boone v. United Founders Life Insurance Co. 84 was an action instituted
to recover under a policy insuring against the entire, irrevocable loss of
sight in one eye. In this case two ophthalmologists testified by deposition.
The first testified regarding the possibility of a corneal transplant, and
stated that due to the surgical risk, the insured did not appear to be inter-
ested in the surgery. The second ophthalmologist testified that the chances
of improving vision through a corneal transplant were probably greater
than fifty percent, but that this opinion should probably be given by the
doctor who was going to do the procedure. The trial court held that the
loss of sight was not irrevocable because a reasonably prudent person
would have submitted to proper medical treatment to seek recovery of the
loss of sight, but the court of civil appeals reversed and remanded. The
court stated that the evidence at best indicated only the possibility of a
successful corneal transplant. The court noted that it was well established
that expert medical testimony must be based on "reasonable medical
probability" as opposed to mere "possibility," since many outcomes are at
least "possible" in the area of medicine.85
The court was also faced with the plaintiff's contention that even if a
successful corneal transplant was performed, he would still be entitled to
recover under the terms of the policy because he would no longer have his
84. 565 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
85. Otis Elevator Co. v. Wood, 436 S.W.2d 324, 331 (Tex. 1968).
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sight, but would be seeing out of someone else's eye. The court agreed
after noting that this was a case of first impression in Texas. The court
followed the Utah case of Knuckles v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,86
which held that once the sight is completely destroyed, the insured should
not be required at his own expense to test the possibilities of recovering his
sight since, under the same policy provision, a person who lost his hand or
foot would not be required to incur similar expenses. Based on the forego-
ing, the court held that the trial court's finding that the loss of sight was not
irrevocable was against the great weight and preponderance of the evi-
dence. It would be interesting to see whether this court would declare that
someone who had had a heart transplant was legally dead and, therefore,
able to recover death benefits under a life insurance policy.
The last case to be discussed involving insurability and coverage is
Northwestern National Lfe Insurance Co. v. Glenn.87 In that case the in-
sured brought suit for benefits under an employee group health and acci-
dent policy that was in effect for one year. It contained a provision that in
the case of an insured who was totally disabled on the policy termination
date, an extension of coverage would be granted for an additional three
months or until the cessation of the total disability, whichever occurred
first. During the policy period the insured became totally disabled, and
her disability continued beyond the termination of the policy. The insurer
provided benefits for three months after the policy's termination date. The
trial court entered judgment for the insured for additional benefits based
upon Maryland Casualty Co. v. Thomas,88 which held that medical ex-
penses were "incurred" as of the date of the injury that necessitated medi-
cal services, whether or not the services were actually rendered and paid
for at that time. The court of civil appeals reversed and rendered, holding
that since the insured had not contracted for medical care to be paid ante-
cedent to the date coverage terminated, the expenses were not incurred
while the policy was in force. The court disagreed with the Thomas hold-
ing as to when expenses were incurred and distinguished the case on the
grounds that in Thomas the medical treatment was provided under a price
contracted for prior to the policy's termination.
Beneficiaries. In Odle v. Williamson89 the question was whether the in-
sured had substantially complied with the method for changing benefi-
ciaries provided in the policy. The insured died in an accident
approximately a year after a divorce from the named beneficiary. The pol-
icy provided that a change of beneficiary would not be binding until writ-
ten notice of the change was received by the company. The daughter, who
brought the suit, testified that she thought her father had made her the
beneficiary. After his death she found a letter from the Exxon Travel
Club, through whom her father had obtained the policy, which stated:
86. 25 Utah 2d 319, 480 P.2d 745 (1971).
87. 568 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.).
88. 289 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1956, writ ref d n.r.e.).
89. 570 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
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"The enclosed form may be used to change your class of membership.
Your daughter may be covered under your membership as long as she
meets the eligibility requirements defined in the attached memoran-
dum."9 It was her impression that this letter concerned changing the ben-
eficiary on the policy, though there was other testimony indicating that the
purpose of the letter was to advise the insured that his daughter could
obtain coverage under the policy. The granddaughter of the insured testi-
fied that she saw her grandfather write a letter to Exxon requesting that the
beneficiary on the policy be changed from his ex-wife to the plaintiff. She
further saw him include it in his monthly gas payment to Exxon. She,
however, did not see him deposit the letter in the mail. She further testi-
fied that he received a change of beneficiary form and that she saw him fill
out the form changing the beneficiary. She also saw him stamp and ad-
dress the envelope to Exxon and place the beneficiary form therein.
Again, however, she did not see him place the letter in the mail, although
he told her that he intended to do so. There was no evidence showing that
the letter indicating a desire to change the beneficiary was ever received by
Exxon or the insurer.
The court stated that when a policy defines the method of changing the
beneficiary, such change is not accomplished until there has been substan-
tial compliance with that method.9' This is accomplished when the in-
sured has done all that he can reasonably do to effect the change.92 In the
instant case, the mailing of the letter would have been substantial compli-
ance; however, there was no evidence that anyone ever mailed the letter or
that the insured ever told anyone to do so. Based thereon, the court re-
versed the trial court judgment for the insured's daughter and rendered
judgment for the appellant.
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Mooney9 3 the company contended that a
policy on the life of the insured had lapsed for nonpayment of premiums
and that the insured had failed to timely accept a late payment offer to
reinstate the policy. The policy required monthly premiums to be paid on
or before the first day of the month or within a grace period of thirty-one
days thereafter. The Mooneys failed to pay the premium for May 1 by
June 1, the last day of the grace period. On June 4 Allstate sent a late
payment offer stating that the policy would be reinstated if all past due
premiums were received by June 25, provided that the insured was living
when payment was received. On June 28 the premium payment was
mailed in order to reinstate the policy. The insured died on June 30, and
Allstate received the premiums on July 1. On July 3 Allstate, having
knowledge that the insured had died, sent the beneficiary a claimant state-
90. Id at 190.
91. The court cited Scherer v. Wahlstrom, 318 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1958, writ refd), in support of this proposition.
92. Tips v. Security Life & Accident Co., 144 Tex. 461, 464, 191 S.W.2d 470, 471 (1945);
Witt v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 440 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969, no writ).
93. 562 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.).
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ment form, a medical authorization form, and a letter requesting a certified
copy of the death certificate. On July 10 Allstate returned the premium.
The beneficiary claimed that Allstate waived the termination of the pol-
icy by forwarding a late payment offer, by cashing her check, and by for-
warding her the requested death claim data. Allstate claimed that the
policy terminated by its own terms on June 1, that the late payment offer
expired on June 25, and further that the insured died before Allstate re-
ceived the premium. The court held that after the insured died, there was
no subject matter to which the provisions of the lapsed policy could attach.
A life insurance policy must be in effect at the time of the insured's death
or else no liability exists;94 conduct by the insurer after the insured's death
cannot reinstate the policy. As a result, Allstate did not waive the termina-
tion of the lapsed policy by cashing the premium check and furnishing
proof of death forms after the insured's death.
IV. INSURANCE AGENTS, ADJUSTERS, AND OTHER PERSONNEL
Several cases were decided during the past year concerning actions of
insurance agents and adjusters and the effects their conduct had on the
rights of insured. In Mandola v. Mariotti5 the court of civil appeals re-
versed a summary judgment on the ground that a fact issue was raised
concerning whether the representations of the claims adjuster tolled the
statute of limitations. The personal injury action was filed more than two
years after the date of the accident; consequently, the defendant filed a
motion for summary judgment based upon the statute of limitations. The
plaintiff's affidavit stated that the adjuster contacted her shortly after the
accident and advised her that she did not need an attorney because the
company would take care of the damages. The plaintiff stated that the
adjuster paid medical bills as they accrued and periodically reassured her
that the company would pay the damages. After the statute of limitations
had run, the adjuster informed the plaintiff that the company was no
longer responsible for her damages because she had failed to file a timely
action.
The attached affidavit of the claims adjuster stated that she discussed the
matter with the plaintiff and paid several medical bills, but did not suggest
that the company was waiving the right to defend the claim fully or that
suit need not be filed within two years. In an attached affidavit the insured
defendant stated that he did not tell the plaintiff that either he or the insur-
ance company was waiving the right to defend the claim fully.
The court, following established law,96 stated that a party who misrepre-
sents a material fact that induces the plaintiff to postpone filing suit may be
estopped from asserting the statute of limitations. Further, this estoppel
94. Grand Lodge Colored Knights of Pythias v. Preston, 91 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1936, writ refd).
95. 557 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
96. Ladd v. Knowles, 505 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Lanpar Co. v. Stanfield, 474 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, writ refd n.r.e.).
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may arise due to the acts of an agent or representative or a party.97 The
court held that although statements made by an adjuster or agent admit-
ting liability without the insured's knowledge ordinarily are not admis-
sions of the insured,98 an adjuster's statements could estop the insured
from asserting the statute of limitations.99 The conflicting factual aver-
ments in this case necessitated a trial on the merits.
In Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Co. v. Rabun " the insurer brought
a declaratory judgment action to establish that there was no valid automo-
bile liablity insurance policy in effect at the time of the accident. The pol-
icy had been cancelled by the company on June 9, and the insured had
received a notice of premium due and a subsequent cancellation notice.
The insured and his insurance agent, who was a local recording agent as
defined by article 21.14 of the Texas Insurance Code,' were close friends.
On the evening of July 19 the agent called the insured to obtain his wife's
services as a babysitter. During this telephone conversation a discussion
ensued regarding reinstatement of the policy, and the agent told the in-
sured that although his schedule would not permit a meeting for actual
payment of premium by the insured until July 24, the insured should not
worry because everything was fine.' 1 2
The accident occurred the day before the meeting to pay the premium.
The insured's wife went to the agent's home, informed him of the accident,
completed a reinstatement form, and paid the required premium. At the
agent's request, both the form and the check were backdated to serve as a
memorandum of the telephone conversation of July 19. The agent testified
that this was done solely to enable the company to consider whether the
conversation of July 19 was sufficient to provide coverage. The company
declined to pay the damages. Evidence revealed that on previous occa-
sions the agent had sold insurance to the insured pursuant to oral agree-
ments. The agent would meet with the insured later and submit a policy
dated as of the date of the oral binder. The agent had also orally rein-
stated policies for the insured, in which case he would pick up premiums at
the insured's home subsequent to their conversation.
The agent's contract with the company expressly provided that an auto-
mobile policy was not to be reinstated by oral binder. The agent, however,
testified that he was not sure as to his authority because he had not read
the provision in his contract. The trial court entered judgment for the in-
sured and the company appealed, contending that it was not bound be-
97. General Ins. Co. of America v. United States, 406 F.2d 442 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 902 (1969); Koudsi v. Mathiwos, 147 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1940, no
writ).
98. Kuehne v. Denson, 148 Tex. 54, 59, 219 S.W.2d 1006, 1009 (1949).
99. G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1929, holding approved).
100. 561 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, writ dism'd).
101. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.14 (Vernon 1963). Under this article a local recording
agent is authorized to solicit business and to write, sign, execute, and deliver policies of
insurance, and to bind companies on insurance risks.
102. 561 S.W.2d at 241.
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cause the specified mode of reinstatement had not been followed, and
further, that since the premium had not been paid, an oral binder could
not be effective. The court followed the principles set out in Bailey v. Sov-
ereign Camp,"°3 which followed the majority rule for dealing with the re-
newal of lapsed policies. Bailey held that in order for a waiver of the
insured's forfeiture to occur, the insurer must have knowledge of the facts
constituting the forfeiture of the certificate, the forfeiture must be complete
and absolute, and there must be some unequivocal act on the part of the
insurer that recognizes the continuance of the policy, or that is wholly in-
consistent with its forfeiture. °4 In the instant case the question was
whether there was an unequivocal act on the part of the insurer that recog-
nized the continuance of the policy. The agent had reinstated the policy
by an oral binder, just as he had done on other occasions. Since the agent
was a local recording agent, he had the power to waive stipulations and
conditions of the policy and to bind his principal. The court, therefore,
found that the policy was in existence on the date of the accident.
In Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Burnette "5 the court had before it a
policy that provided that it would be automatically renewed at expiration
unless either the company mailed written notice to the insured of its inten-
tion to decline renewal at least thirty days in advance of the expiration
date or the insured advised the company that he did not want the policy to
be renewed. At the time of the policy's expiration, the insurance agent's
records incorrectly indicated that the policy had been renewed. Since the
insurance company had not received a renewal request, it assumed that the
insurance agent had written the policy through another company; conse-
quently, it did not renew the insured's policy.
The court held that the insurance company was only required to give
notice to the insured if it intended to decline renewal. Since in this case
the company had intended to renew the policy, it had no duty to give no-
tice of nonrenewal and could not be found negligent for having failed to
do so. Since the company had not given notice of nonrenewal, however,
the policy was renewed as a matter of law. The court further found that
under the agency contract between the company and the agent, the agent
had a contractual duty to service the company's policies, to renew them,
replace them, or to notify policy holders if they were not to be renewed.
Since the agent had breached this duty, he was required to indemnify the
company for its loss. The agent claimed that he was entitled to indemnifi-
cation under State Board of Insurance regulation 8a." °6 The court stated
that this regulation was enacted for the protection of policyholders and not
103. 116 Tex. 160, 286 S.W. 456 (1926).
104. Id. at 166, 286 S.W. at 457.
105. 560 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ).
106. Id. at 443. This regulation provides that a policy must be renewed at expiration, at
the option of the policyholder, unless the company mails written notice to the policyholder
of its intention to decline renewal at least 30 days in advance of the policy expiration date.
The company may comply by having its agent notify the policyholder. Nevertheless, the
responsibility of giving notice to the insured remains with the company if the agent fails to
carry out its instructions to notify the insured. Id. at 441 n.2.
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for the protection of negligent agents. As a result, the agent's claim was
denied.
V. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AND THE INSURANCE CODE
In Mobile County Mutual Insurance Co. P. Jewell"°7 the court held that
article 21.21, section 16 of the Insurance Code' 0 8 and the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act (DTPA) °9 do not apply to county mutual insurance
companies. County mutual insurance companies are controlled by chapter
17 of the Texas Insurance Code, article 17.22 of which provides that those
companies are exempt from the operation of all insurance laws of the state
except as chapter 17 otherwise provides.' l° Since none of the articles in
chapter 17 provide for coverage of county mutual insurance companies
under article 21.21, the court of civil appeals stated that county mutual
insurance companies were exempt from its provisions, and the supreme
court agreed. The supreme court noted that private persons who deal with
county mutuals are not afforded the same protection against unfair and
deceptive insurance practices that is afforded to persons who deal with
other types of insurance companies and directed the attention of the legis-
lature to this discrepancy.
Ceshker v. Bankers Commercial Life Insurance Co. "' significantly
broadened the right of consumers to bring action under article 21.21. The
plaintiff brought suit to recover damages allegedly incurred as the result of
his reliance upon the insurance company's alleged deceptive advertising.
The company had circulated an advertisement as a newspaper supplement
announcing a Medicare Companion Service Policy that contained a de-
tachable application for said policy. Several weeks later the company
placed a second advertisement in the same newspaper announcing a Hos-
pital Cash Income Policy that also contained a detachable application. It
was undisputed that the advertisements and applications differed in ap-
pearance, color, and content. Subsequently, the company received a com-
pleted application from the prospective insured for the hospital policy, and
a policy was issued. In September the carrier received a claim form for
107. 555 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam, 566
S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1978).
108. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-78 provides:
Relief Available to Injured Parties.-(a) Any person who has been injured by
another's engaging in any of the practices declared in Section 4 of this Article
or in rules or regulations lawfully adopted by the Board under this Article to
be unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in
the business of insurance or in any practice defined by Section 17.46 of the
Business & Commerce Code, as amended, as an unlawful deceptive trade
practice may maintain an action against the company or companies engaging
in such acts or practices.
(b) In a suit filed under this section, any plaintiff who prevails may obtain:
(1) three times the amount of actual damages plus court costs and attorneys'
fees reasonable in relation to the amount of work expended. ...
109. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
110. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 17.22 (Vernon 1963).
111. 558 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977), writ refd n.r.e per curiam, 568
S.W.2d 128 (Tex. 1978).
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medical treatment received by the insured that undiputedly was not cov-
ered by the hospital policy. The plaintiff alleged that he had relied upon
the first advertisement in sending in the application attached to the second
advertisement. He admitted that he did not pay attention to the form,
color, or content of the two advertisements, and did not read anything
other than the boldface type in one of them.
The plaintiff brought suit under section 16 of article 21.21.' 12 The court
of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the
company on the ground that the plaintiff had no standing to bring a cause
of action under section 16(a) of article 21.21 because be was not a "person"
within the terms of section 2 of that article." 3 The court held that one
must be engaged in the business of insurance to bring suit under article
21.21 and that the article did not confer a private cause of action upon
consumers. The insured also claimed that the summary judgment was im-
proper because a fact issue had been created as to whether he might have
recovered under section 17.50 of the DTPA." 4 The court stated that a
consumer may maintain an action under that section if he had been ad-
versely affected by the use or employment by any person of any act or
practice that either has been declared to be unlawful by section 17.46 of
the DTPA" 5 or that is in violation of article 21.21.' 16 It was undisputed,
however, that the insured had applied for the second advertised policy,
that the two advertisements were totally different, and that the second pol-
icy did not cover the claim. Based on these facts, as a matter of law the
insured was not adversely affected; a consumer may not bring an action
based on an alleged misrepresentation in an insurance policy that he never
purchased.
The supreme court denied writ in a per curiam opinion, stating that al-
though it disapproved of "the holding which construed the [Insurance]
Code to limit the term 'person' to one who is engaged in the business of
insurance," " 7 the judgment of the court of civil appeals was correct for the
other reasons stated.
Ceshker was followed in Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Bar Consultants,
Inc. "' In that case an insurance policy provided only limited coverage for
vandalism and malicious mischief. Immediately after such a loss occurred,
the agent and his secretary confirmed that the damage was covered under
the policy. After an investigation, the adjuster told the insured that the
112. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1978). Section 16 is
set forth in note 108 supra.
113. Section 2 provides in part: "When used in this Act: (a) 'Person' shall mean any
individual, corporation, association, partnership,. . . and any other legal entity engaged in
the business of insurance .... " TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 2 (Vernon 1963).
114. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
115. Id § 17.46. This is commonly known as the "laundry list" of violations.
116. Section 17.50(a)(4) of the DTPA authorizes a consumer to bring suit if he has been
adversely affected by the use or employment of an act or practice in violation of art. 21.21 or
the rules or regulations of the State Board of Insurance issued under art. 21.21. TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
117. 568 S.W.2d at 129.
118. 566 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, writ granted).
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loss was not covered. In the meantime the insured had undertaken repairs
based upon the agent's assurances of coverage. The trial court found that
the agent's misrepresentations concerning the coverage amounted to a vio-
lation of section 17.46(12) of the DTPA, ' 9 and pursuant to article 21.21 of
the Insurance Code and section 17.50 of the DTPA the plaintiffs were enti-
tled to treble damages, court costs, and attorneys' fees. The court of civil
appeals followed the supreme court's denial of writ in Ceshker, and over-
ruled the defendant's contention that plaintiff was not entitled to bring a
cause of action under article 21.21. Although the court held that the state-
ments of the agent were misrepresentations in violation of section 7.46(12)
of the DTPA, it specifically reserved the question whether the plaintiff was
also entitled to pursue a cause of action under that Act.
In granting writ of error, 120 the supreme court stated that it would con-
sider whether the agent had authority to bind the insurance company by
his post-loss statements, and whether the insured was "injured"'' 2 ' by the
misrepresentations. The court of civil appeals did not consider the first of
these questions and only briefly discussed the second, stating that since the
insured had acted upon the agent's representations of coverage and had
proceeded to repair the premises, he had been injured within the meaning
of article 21.21.122
In National Lloyds Insurance Co. v. McCasland 23 the court was faced
with the question whether article 21.35 of the Insurance Code, 124 which
requires attachment of the application to the policy, could be waived by
the insured. Although the policy did not contain the application for insur-
ance, the insurer introduced proof that the insured had willfully concealed
or misrepresented material facts in the application. No objections were
made to the introduction of such testimony, and it was not raised as a
ground in the motion for a new trial. In his brief before the court of civil
appeals, plaintiff had various no-evidence points of error, but he did not
specifically raise article 21.35. In oral argument, however, he raised for the
first time the claim that the article rendered all the evidence supporting the
119. This section declares it unlawful to represent "that an agreement confers or involves
rights, remedies or obligations which it does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by
law." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(12) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
120. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 96 (Nov. 23, 1978).
121. To maintain an action under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon Supp.
1978-79), a consumer must have been adversely affected. To maintain an action under TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon 1963), however, the person must have been injured.
122. After the survey period ended, the supreme court affirmed the court of civil appeals
decision. 577 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. 1979). The court held Royal Globe was liable for the decep-
tive acts of its agents even when Royal Globe neither authorized nor had knowledge that
they had occurred. As to injury, the court said: "[t]he injury to Bar Consultants was that it
believed it was covered by a policy of insurance from any loss caused by vandalism when it
was not so covered." Id. at 223.
123. 566 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1978).
124. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.35 (Vernon 1963) provides in part:
Except as otherwise provided in this code, every contract or policy of insur-
ance issued or contracted for in this State shall be accompanied by a written,
photographic or printed copy of the application for such insurance policy or
contract, as well as a copy of all questions asked and answers given thereto.
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jury verdict inadmissible. The court of civil appeals recognized that the
plaintiff had raised article 21.35 for the first time on appeal, but because
the statute was viewed as mandatory, the court concluded that the plain-
tiffs no-evidence objections were sufficient to preserve the complaint. 125
The supreme court reversed, holding that plaintiff waived this point by not
including it in his motion for new trial as required by rules 320, 321, and
322 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.' 26
125. McCasland v. National Lloyds Ins. Co., 553 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1977).
126. TEX. R. Civ. P. 320 stated, at the time of trial, that "each motion for new trial...
shall specify each ground on which it is founded, and no ground not specified shall be con-
sidered." TEX. R. Civ. P. 321 provides:
Each ground of a motion for a new trial. . . shall briefly refer to that part of
the ruling of the court, charge given to the jury, or charge refused, admission
or rejection of evidence, or other proceedings which are designated to be com-
plained of, in such way as that the point of objection can be clearly identified
and understood by the court.
TEx. R. Civ. P. 322 provides that "grounds of objection couched in general terms... shall
not be considered by the court."
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